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We propose an efficient strategy to attack a continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-
QKD) system, that we call homodyne detector blinding. This attack strategy takes advantage of
a generic vulnerability of homodyne receivers: a bright light pulse sent on the signal port can lead
to a saturation of the detector electronics. While detector saturation has already been proposed to
attack CV-QKD, the attack we study in this paper has the additional advantage of not requiring
an eavesdropper to be phase locked with the homodyne receiver. We show that under certain
conditions, an attacker can use a simple laser, incoherent with the homodyne receiver, to generate
bright pulses and bias the excess noise to arbitrary small values, fully comprising CV-QKD security.
These results highlight the feasibility and the impact of the detector blinding attack. We finally
discuss how to design countermeasures in order to protect against this attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is one of the
most important and practical applications of quantum
information processing. It has already been made com-
mercially available and has deployed in test and produc-
tion environments. QKD allows two remote parties Alice
and Bob, to establish a secret key over a public quantum
channel, assisted by a classical communication channel.
QKD security can notably be guaranteed even against
computationally unbounded adversaries, making QKD
the only available information-theoretic secure key es-
tablishment scheme practically available to date, beyond
the use of physically-protected secret couriers. QKD
information-theoretic security is however relies on some
minimal set of assumptions: Alice and Bob labs, where
secret information is stored and processed, should not
leak this information to the outside world, moreover, Al-
ice and Bob hardware (laser, modulators, detectors) are
supposed to behave (at least approximately) according to
an abstracted model, that then allows to proof theoretical
security. However, in practice, the real-world QKD im-
plementations not act exactly verify the aforementioned
assumptions and such deviations may lead to vulnerabili-
ties and enable an eavesdropper, Eve, to launch so-called
side channel attacks and break the security of practical
QKD devices.
In discrete-variable (DV) QKD, single photon detec-
tor (SPD) is the most exposed device, from the imple-
mentation security viewpoint, and several attack strate-
gies have been proposed to exploit SPD vulnerabilities
and attack DV-QKD implementations. Attacks such
∗ qinhao@casquantumnet.com
as time shift [3, 4], after gate [5], blinding [6], spa-
tial mode mismatch [7] attacks and etc. may all lead
to security breach. Among those attacks, the blind-
ing attack is probably considered as the most power-
ful attack, as this attack strategy allows Eve to actively
control Bob’s SPD remotely, using intense light. Such
kind of attack has been experimentally demonstrated on
commercial QKD systems [8] and in a full-field deploy-
ment [9]. Various countermeasures [10, 11] have been
proposed against detector-based attacks. However only
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [12, 13],
i.e. QKD protocols where security can be established
without trusting the detector, can firmly demonstrate to
be immune against these attacks targeting SPDs.
Continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD) [14], is another
promising approach to perform quantum key distribu-
tion. It relies on continuous modulation of the light field
quadratures and measurements with coherent detection
(homodyne or heterodyne detectors) instead of SPDs in
DV-QKD system. Benefiting from coherent detection,
CV-QKD can be fully implemented with off-the-shelf op-
tical communication components [15–17]. Moreover, the
local oscillator (LO) in the coherent detection acts as a
”built-in” filter to efficiently remove any noise photons in
different modes, which enable CV-QKD to be deployed in
co-existence with intense classical channels over optical
networks [18] and to be possibly implemented in day light
free space environments. CV-QKD practical implemen-
tations however also suffer from potential vulnerabilities.
For example LO manipulation is a long standing secu-
rity problem: if LO is sent on the public channel, then
an attacker can modify LO pulses in different ways [19–
23] and learn secret keys without being discovered. A
generic solution to this issue has however been recently
proposed: by generating locally the LO (LLO) pulses
at Bob side [24–27]. Regarding the homodyne detection
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
01
62
0v
2 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
6 J
ul 
20
18
2(HD), which is a central component in CV-QKD, it has
been shown in [28, 29], under the name “saturation at-
tack” that HD saturation can be induced by an attacker
and exploited to launch attacks that can fully break CV-
QKD security. More precisely it has been shown that HD
saturation induced by a coherent displacement can bias
the excess noise estimation and conceal the presence of
an eavesdropper, performing intercept-resend attack on
the signals sent by Alice. However, coherently displacing
the signal sent by Alice, without adding detectable excess
noise is highly challenging, making this attack strategy
difficult to implement in practice.
In this paper, inspired by the blinding attack in DV-
QKD, we propose a simple and practical way to saturate
a homodyne detector with finite linear detection range.
The attack exploits the loss imbalance of the two ports, in
a balanced HD and consists in sending a bright pulse onto
the signal port, to induce electronic saturation. Such
loss imbalance is quite generic to any HD implementa-
tion: the two photodiodes quantum efficiencies as well
as the beam-splitter reflection/transmittance coefficients
are never perfectly balanced. This implies the need for
additional balancing, that is in general ensured by intro-
ducing some variable attenuation in one of the optical
arms. Such balancing must be done with precision with
respect to the LO port, since LO pulses are intense. But
as a consequence, a good balancing in practice cannot,
in return, be guaranteed with respect to the other port,
i.e. the signal port. As a consequence, any relatively
strong light impinging on the signal port will produce a
comparatively stronger photocurrent on one of the HD
photodetectors, which will further cause HD’s amplifier
electronic saturation.
Due to HD saturation, Bob’s HD output signals are
limited within some finite range. This however violates
a basic assumption generally used in CV-QKD security
proof: linearity, namely that Bob’s HD output signal is
supposed to be linearly proportional to the input optical
quadratures. The principle of the blinding attack we in-
troduce here consists, for Eve, to actively drive Bob’s HD
into a saturated response mode, by sending strong exter-
nal pulses on the signal port. We will show that such
manipulation can be used to reduce the estimated excess
noise, under certain conditions. More precisely, we will
show that combining the sending of strong light pulses to
Bob, with a full intercept-resend attack, Eve can break
the security of the widely used Gaussian Modulated Co-
herent State (GMCS) CV-QKD protocol [30, 31]. We will
analyze the conditions such that Eve can achieve a full
security break, illustrating that this attack can be imple-
mented with current technologies and a low-complexity
experimental system. Importantly, our attack only tar-
gets on the HD which means even the recent proposed
LLO CV-QKD scheme is not immune to this attack if
no countermeasure is considered. This highlights that
detector loopholes also exist in CV-QKD and can poten-
tially affect all CV-QKD implementations. Finally we
will discuss possible countermeasures against detector-
based attacks in CV-QKD and compare them with coun-
termeasures against blinding attack in DV-QKD.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we
present the security basis of GMCS CV-QKD: param-
eter estimation and its relation to quantum hacking. In
Sec. III, we study experimentally several imperfections
of a practical HD and predict the shot noise measure-
ments with the proposed HD model. In Sec. IV, we in-
troduce the attack strategy of the HD blinding attack. In
Sec. V, we perform the security analysis of the proposed
strategy and demonstrate its security breach feasibility
in simulations. At last, we discuss possible countermea-
sures against HD blinding attack in CV-QKD in Sec. VI,
and conclude in Sec. VII.
II. PRACTICAL SECURITY IN CV-QKD
In this section, we briefly present the Gaussian Modu-
lated Coherent State (GMCS) CV-QKD protocol. This
protocol is widely used, notably thanks to a well-
understood security proof, base on the optimality of
Gaussian attacks [32]. We will be focused on the GMCS
protocol throughout the paper, and illustrate in this sec-
tion the connection between the parameter estimation
phase, and the practical attack strategy.
A. GMCS protocol and parameter estimation
In GMCS protocol [30], Alice prepares the coherent
state |X+iP 〉 as the quantum signal, in which amplitude
X and phase P quadratures are continuously modulated
with a centered Gaussian distribution with a variance
VAN0. The shot noise N0 is the HD variance when the
input signal is vacuum field. At Bob’s side, he performs
HD on Alice’s signal by interfering it with strong phase
reference LO. Bob randomly chooses to apply a phase
modulation 0 or pi/2 on LO in order to measure quadra-
ture X or P in phase space. Note that, it is not necessary
for Alice to send LO over the insecure channel, Bob can
generate the LO at his side and recover the phase infor-
mation with help of additional reference pulses from Alice
[24–27]. By repeating such process and sifting, Alice and
Bob then obtain correlated Gaussian variables (XA, XB)
as the raw keys. With reverse reconciliation [30, 33],
Alice and Bob can extract an identical bits string from
the correlated variables and obtain a secret key through
privacy amplification.
In order to estimate Eve’s knowledges on the raw key
and eliminate them in privacy amplification, an impor-
tant step for Alice and Bob is to perform the parameter
estimation to estimate excess noise, channel transmis-
sion and secret key rate. Security proofs of CV-QKD
show that Gaussian attack is the optimal one which has
been proven in collective attacks with asymptotic limit
[34, 35], in recent composable security proof[36] and in ar-
bitrary attacks with finite size [37]. Such security proofs
3enable Alice and Bob to describe their quantum chan-
nel as a Gaussian linear channel which connects the raw
data XA and XB with a Gaussian noise factor XN . This
channel model allows Alice and Bob to determine the
two characteristics of the quantum channel: excess noise
ξ and channel transmission T by performing four mea-
surements. Particularly, Alice’s modulation variance VA,
Bob’s HD variance VB , Alice-Bob covariance CovAB and
shot noise calibration of Bob’s HD variance VB,0 when
there is only LO input:
VA = 〈X2A〉 − 〈XA〉2, (1)
CovAB = 〈XAXB〉 − 〈XA〉〈XB〉 =
√
ηTVA, (2)
VB = 〈X2B〉 − 〈XB〉2 = ηTVA +N0 + ηTξ + vele,
(3)
VB0 = N0 + vele, (4)
in which η and vele are Bob’s HD overall efficiency and
electronic noise which are calibrated before QKD, N0 is
the shot noise variance. Alice and Bob can extract a
portion of the raw key and estimate the channel trans-
mission T based on Eqs. (1) and (2); and excess noise in
shot noise units ξ/N0 based on Eqs. (3) and (4). They
can then estimate the security key rate with a given se-
curity proof and decide whether to proceed to the key
generation step or abort the protocol if there the secure
key rate estimation is non-positive. Note that we need to
take statistical fluctuation into account for the variance
measurements with a realistic data block size N [38] in
practice. In this paper, we want to emphasize the idea
of the attack strategy, we only consider the collective at-
tacks in asymptotic limit (N →∞).
B. Quantum hacking in CV-QKD
The goal of Eve’s quantum hacking on CV-QKD sys-
tem is to steal Alice and Bob’s secret keys without being
discovered. To achieve this, Eve is allowed to use every
possible measure that is allowed by quantum mechanics
to attack the open quantum channel. Some CV-QKD
quantum hacking strategies such as wavelength attack
[22] and LO intensity fluctuation attack [20] are only pos-
sible in theory that Eve has full access to future quantum
computer with enough quantum memory. Under such
cases, loopholes lead to increase of Eve’s mutual infor-
mation with Alice or Bob and to decrease the final secret
key rate. It is however more important to study pos-
sible quantum hacking strategies in a realistic scenario
when Eve’s power is limited by current technologies, as
it would bring immediate threats to CV-QKD security.
In CV-QKD, excess noise estimation is the reference
for Alice and Bob to decide to abort the protocol or pro-
ceed to key generation. Any flaw in the excess noise es-
timation can lead to security problem that Eve’s attack
action is undiscovered, which may fully compromise CV-
QKD security. In order to attack CV-QKD with current
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FIG. 1. A simplified scheme of a practical HD, BS: beam-
splitter, VOA: variable optical attenuator, PD: photodiode,
AMP: amplifiers, ADC: analog-to-digital converter, solid line:
optical signal, dash line: electronic signal.
technologies, Eve can perform an intercept-resend (IR)
attack by using optical heterodyne detection [39] which
corresponds to a “entanglement breaking” channel. Un-
der IR attack, Eve always has an information advantage
over Alice and Bob but she also introduces at least 2N0
into their excess noise estimation due to the heterodyne
measurement disturbance and coherent state shot noise.
Meanwhile, Eve can take advantage of CV-QKD imple-
mentation imperfections to formalize particular attack
strategies to bias Alice and Bob’s excess noise estimation
in order to hide her IR action and achieve a full secu-
rity breach. For examples, in calibration attack [19], Eve
delays the LO pulse such that Alice and Bob overesti-
mate the shot noise based on their pre-established cal-
ibration, which results in underestimation of the excess
noise. In saturation attack [28, 29], Eve induces satura-
tion on Bob’s HD measurement and directly bias Alice
and Bob’s excess noise. In this paper, we also follow this
idea and will take advantage of several imperfections in
a HD to archive a security breach on GMCS CV-QKD
implementations.
III. IMPERFECT HOMODYNE DETECTION IN
CV-QKD
In this section, we analyze HD imperfections such as
imbalance and electronics saturation. These HD imper-
fections are the key elements that will be used in the HD
blinding attack strategy.
A. Practical homodyne detection with
imperfections
In the context of CV-QKD , HD performance is usu-
ally measured by its overall efficiency η and its electronic
noise vele [15, 17]. However, imperfections such as limited
bandwidth, linearity range, imperfect balance, etc., can
also affect HD behavior and potentially impact on CV-
QKD performance [40]. Some of these HD imperfections
may even open security loopholes in CV-QKD to Eve
which need to be carefully studied. Here, we are partic-
ularly interested in the imperfection of the HD on the
optical part: imbalanced 50/50 beam-splitter (BS) and
on the electronic part: finite linear range of detection.
4As shown in Fig. 1, a practical HD consists both optical
and electronic parts. The input optical signals and LO
pulses go into the two ports of 50/50 BS and with one
another. Two output optical pulses then travel to two
identical p-i-n photodiodes (PDs) which convert optical
lights into two photocurrents with finite quantum effi-
ciencies. An electronic subtraction is then performed on
the two photocurrents and the subtracted photocurrent is
amplified into a small voltage through a trans-impedance
amplifier or a charge amplifier. The voltage signal is fur-
ther amplified by a second stage amplifier to be detected
by the Analog-to-digital converter (ADC) device (i.e., os-
cilloscope or data acquisition card). The final digitized
data is so-called HD output signal which is proportional
to the input optical quadratures. The selection of the
quadrature is dependent on the relative phase between
LO and signal pulse.
Thanks to the subtraction of HD, most LO intensi-
ties are eliminated while the rest energy carries the small
quantum signal fluctuation which is “amplified” by LO’s
amplitude. However due to the imbalance imperfection
of the HD, a non-negligible leakage of LO contributes
to the final HD output signal as an offset. Such leak-
age may also contribute LO intensity fluctuation noise
into HD measurements if LO intensity is relatively high
[41]. In order to adjust the balance of HD, a vari-
able optical attenuator (VOA) and a variable delay line
(VDL) need to be added to one of the optical paths af-
ter the 50/50 BS. The balancing of HD is evaluated by
the common-mode rejection ratio (CMRR) which is de-
fined as CMRR = −20 log10(2) with  as the overall
imbalance factor [41],  quantifies the small deviation
that varies from a perfect balanced HD. For example,
a typical CMRR value of a well balanced HD is around
−52.4 dB [40] which means the difference between the
two photocurrents before subtraction is  = 0.12% over
their total currents.
In order to quantify the impact of such imbalance im-
perfection on HD, we analyze the case of shot noise mea-
surement when there is no signal but only LO pulses sent
into HD, in which we look at the first and second mo-
ment of HD statistics: mean and variance. To simplify
the analysis, we consider the model of unbalanced HD
with two ports in Ref. 21. If there is only LO impinging
on HD, the HD output state XHD can be given:
XHD = η(1− 2Thd)Ilo + 2
√
ηThd(1− Thd)IloX0 +Xele,
(5)
in which Thd is the overall transmission of HD, which
includes the transmission of the 50/50 BS, optical loss
in the optical path and efficiency of the PD while 1 −
Thd is the overall reflection,  = 1 − 2Thd is thus the
overall imbalance factor. Ilo is the number of photons per
one LO pulse (which is linear dependent on LO power
or intensity), X0 is the vacuum state, Xele is the HD
electronic noise with a variance of vele. We observe that
the HD output is displaced by a value Dlo [first term in
Eq. (5)] that is linearly proportional to Ilo due to LO
leakage, which directly determine the mean of XHD:
〈XHD〉 = Dlo = η(1− 2Thd)Ilo, (6)
here the vacuum state is centered on zero 〈X0〉 = 0, and
we assume the offset due to the HD electronics is small
enough to be neglected 〈Xele〉 ≈ 0. We can further de-
duce the HD variance based on Eq. (5) with the definition
of variance:
VHD =〈X2HD〉 − 〈XHD〉2
=η2(1− 2Thd)2f2loI2lo + 4(1− Thd)ThdηIlo + vele,
(7)
in which flo =
√〈I2lo〉 − 〈Ilo〉2/Ilo is the intensity fluc-
tuation ratio of LO over the measurement time and the
first quadratic term of Ilo is the noise variance due to
LO intensity fluctuations [41]. If we consider a typical
CV-QKD implementation [17] with a low LO power Ilo
as the order of 108 and HD is adjusted to be balanced
(Thd ≈ 0.5), we can neglect the LO intensity fluctuation
noise and the degradation effect due to imbalance as the
factor 4(1−Thd)Thd ≈ 1. Eq. (7) can be further simplified
into:
VHD ≈ ηIlo + vele, (8)
where the first term is known as the shot noise N0 = ηIlo
in CV-QKD, which is proportional to Ilo and it can be
interpreted as the HD signal variation due to interference
between LO and the vacuum state with 〈X20 〉 = 1. The
amplification of LO also applies to vacuum state which
attributes to the term of Ilo in Eq. (8). As shown in
Eq. (5) and Eq. (7), LO leakage due to HD imbalance
contributes an offset of Dlo in HD output signals and
associated LO intensity noises in the HD variance mea-
surement.
Beside the HD imbalance imperfection, finite linear de-
tection range of the electronics part can also influence
HD measurements and may lead to security loopholes
[28, 29]. An important assumption in CV-QKD is that
Bob’s HD measurement varies linearly with the input op-
tical quadrature. However such assumption does not al-
ways hold in a practical HD, because if input field quadra-
ture overpasses certain threshold, the corresponding pho-
tocurrent would be relatively large, which can saturate
the electronics and results in saturation of HD output sig-
nal. Electronics saturations usually happen on the am-
plifier or on the data acquisition card (DAQ). Depends
on the specific electronics design, the amplifiers usually
saturate at few volts which is the intrinsic characteristics
of the electronics. DAQ detection range in CV-QKD is
usually set to a small range (typically between −1V and
1V) to ensure its measurement step precision, in prin-
ciple, this range can be set as large as possible but not
infinite. However the overall linear detection range is still
limited by the amplifier. Two p-i-n PDs in HD can also
become saturated mainly due to screening of the electric
field caused by photo-generated carriers [42]. However
5such limit is often relatively high (e.g., few mW for Thor-
labs FGA01FC) and total optical power of LO and signal
in CV-QKD system is much lower than this limit. Thus
PD saturation is usually not the reason causes HD sat-
uration and we consider this realistic assumption in this
paper. In practice, HD saturation is unavoidable and it
is important to make sure HD works in the linear region.
HD saturation effect can be modeled by a simple HD
model [28, 29] with upper and lower bounds α1 and α2,
where Bob’s HD output signal after ADC can be given
as:
XHDr =

α1, XHD > α1
XHD, α2 < XHD < α1
α2, XHD 6 α2
, (9)
in which XHD is given by Eq. (5). This model shows that
the linearity range of HD is limited by [α2, α1], otherwise
HD output signals will be saturated to the limits. The
limits α1 and α2 need to be calibrated in practice and
they are dependent on HD electronics as mentioned. Due
to HD saturation, variations of HD signals become much
lower compared to the case in linear detection region,
which will affect the correctness of HD statistic measure-
ments [28, 29]. Moreover, when there is also the offset
due to imbalance imperfection on HD, it can significantly
change the pre-calibrated linear detection ranges if the
offset factor Dlo becomes comparable to α1 or α2, which
needs to be further studied in experiments.
B. Experimental analysis on a practical homodyne
detector
In order to study influences of HD imbalance and elec-
tronics saturation on HD output signals, we design a sim-
ple experimental test on HD shot noise measurement. We
slightly modify the standard shot noise measurement pro-
cedure and compare the results under different balancing
settings. The key idea of this test is that we intentionally
unbalance HD to study its influence on HD saturation
limit and further on HD output signals.
The experimental setup can be refereed to Fig. 1 where
we only send LO pulses and then measure HD signals.
We use a 1550 nm distributed feedback (DFB) laser (Al-
catel LMI1905) to first prepare a train of optical pulses
with pulse widths 100 ns and repetition rate at 1 MHz as
LO pulses. Our HD consists of two PDs (JDS Uniphase
EPM 605), the AmpTek A250 as the first stage amplifier
with a charge amplifier setting and a MAX4107 as the
second stage amplifier. This HD features a low noise
(with a noise variance at the order of 10mV2) and a
low bandwidth (about 10 MHz). We send LO pulses
into port 2 of HD (Fig. 1) and roughly minimize the
HD output by adjusting optical loss of one path in or-
der to balance the HD, which is considered as the 1st
HD balance setting. After measuring the average opti-
cal power of the input pulses with a power meter, we
FIG. 2. Characterization of HD output voltage statistics, in
absence of signal: under two different balancing conditions
(solid lines and dashed lines). (a) Mean value (V ) versus LO
power. (b) Variance (V 2) versus LO power.
then record HD signals over 1 second which corresponds
to 106 pulses. We adjust our DAQ (Model NI6111) de-
tection range to [−0.5V, 0.5V] as the detection limits.
Any HD signals out of this range will be saturated to
α1 = 0.5V or α2 = −0.5V. Note this is not the satura-
tion limit of our HD amplifier which is about ±3V, but
we want to limit the linear detection range to be small
in order to highlight its influence on HD signals. Based
on the measured 106 HD signals, we then estimate the
mean and variance of this set of data, which is considered
as one shot noise measurement for a given LO intensity.
With the same balance setting, we repeat this shot noise
measurement by gradually increasing LO intensity. The
experimental results for the 1st setting are shown as blue
squares in Fig. 2. As shown in Fig. 2(a), the mean value
first increases linearly with respect to LO intensity, which
matches the prediction of Eq. (6). However, when the LO
intensity reaches to about 35 µW, the mean value stops
6increasing but saturates at 0.5V. This is obviously due
to the HD saturation effect predicted by Eq. (9) when
the imbalance offset Dlo reaches to the detection upper
limit α1. By applying Eq. (7) into Eq. (9) and fitting
experimental data in the linear region, we successfully
predict the behavior of HD mean values as shown on the
blue solid curve in Fig. 2(a).
Regarding to variance measurements, from Fig. 2(b)
we can verify that HD variance increases linearly with LO
intensity which matches the prediction of Eq. (7). Simi-
larly, when LO intensity reaches to a relatively high value
around 35 µW, the variance drops quickly and becomes
zero at about 45 µW. It is because the HD signals vari-
ation becomes much lower when HD is saturated as any
HD signal fluctuations beyond α1 = 0.5V have been cut
off. We also observe that HD variance does not immedi-
ately turn into zero, because only parts of HD signals due
to vacuum fluctuations have been limited by α1 between
35 µW and 45 µW LO intensity. We use the saturation
model [Eq. (9)] and shot noise variance [Eq. (7)] to simu-
late HD variance behaviors as for the blue solid curve. As
shown in Fig. 2(b), the simulation curve matches the be-
haviors of experimental HD variances data, which means
we can account for the saturation model for further anal-
ysis.
In order to illustrate the impact of HD imbalance on
HD signals, we now slightly adjust the optical loss of one
path after BS to unbalance the HD. Such balance setting
(2nd) imposes more LO leakage, which will further affect
the behaviors of HD means and variances. With this bal-
ance setting, we repeat HD statistic measurements men-
tioned above and compare them with previous results at
same LO intensity levels. Experimental and simulation
results are shown as red diamonds and dashed curves in
Fig. 2, respectively. As shown in Fig. 2(a), HD mean un-
der 2nd setting reaches to saturation limit around 35µW
compared to the one at 45µW in the 1st setting. It con-
firms Eq. (7) that HD offset due to LO intensity leakage
is proportional to  and thus the equivalent displacements
Dlo on HD signals of the 2nd setting is larger than the
one of the 1st setting. In consequence, HD signal of 2nd
setting reaches to the detection limit α1 at a smaller value
of LO intensity compared to the 1st setting, which can
be observed by experimental (red diamonds) and simula-
tion (red dashed curve) data in Fig. 2(b). The simulation
curves also confirm the HD statistical behaviors, which
shows that HD imbalance imperfections can influence the
relation between HD saturation level and LO input in-
tensity at a certain extent. Note in CV-QKD, HD is de-
signed to precisely detect weak quantum signals, it can
be saturated easily if the HD is not well balanced as LO
intensity is usually many orders of magnitude stronger
than quantum signal [43, 44].
These experimental and simulation results inspire us
to formalize a new attack strategy in CV-QKD similar
to blinding attack in DV-QKD, where Eve inserts exter-
nal lights into signal port of Bob’s HD to influence HD
output signals by taking advantage of HD imbalance and
saturation imperfections.
IV. HOMODYNE DETECTOR BLINDING
ATTACK ON GMCS CV-QKD
A. Principle of the attack
Based on the previous analysis, Eve can formalize a
simple strategy to saturate Bob’s HD output signal by
sending another incoherent classical light into HD’s sig-
nal port instead of preparing coherent displacement as
in saturation attack [28, 29]. Since Bob balances his HD
with respect to the LO light that goes into LO port, any
relatively strong light going into signal port cannot be
subtracted as much as the one on LO port. Thus the
external light contributes a strong offset on the HD out-
put signal, at certain point it can cause HD saturation
as shown in the previous section. In order to prevent in-
ference with LO pulses, Eve can send the external lights
in a different mode of the LO pulse, in practice she can
use a different wavelength other than the one used for
LO pulses. Moreover, due to the BS wavelength depen-
dent properties, Eve has the possibility to “control” the
transmission of Bob’s BS by selecting proper wavelength
of the external light [21, 22, 45]. On the other hand, the
two PDs used in HD are classical detectors and usually
have large wavelength ranges (typically from 800-1700
nm). Any lights in the sensitive range of the PD can
produce photocurrents and contribute to final HD sig-
nals, which is impossible for Alice and Bob to distinguish
the source of light by only measuring HD signals. How-
ever, as Eve’s external light is incoherent with Alice and
Bob’s LO in CV-QKD, the external lights contribute ex-
cess noises into Alice and Bob’s HD measurements. On
the other hand, such excess noises due to the external
lights can be “sufficiently filtered” by the LO pulses, in
the sense that external light is not interfered with LO
and the related excess noise will be further normalized
by a factor of N0.
As mentioned, in order to break the security with cur-
rent technologies, Eve can combine this strategy with the
IR attack. If Bob’s HD works in the linear region, Alice
and Bob can always notice the excess noise due to Eve’s
IR attack and the external light. However, Eve can al-
ways cause Bob’s HD signal saturation by sending the
external light strong enough. In this sense, Eve is able
to “control” Bob’s HD signals and manipulate the HD
statistic measurements. If Eve carefully selects the prop-
erties of the external light, her manipulation of Bob’s
HD signals can further lead Alice and Bob to underes-
timate the excess noises from Eve’s actions which fully
compromise the security. We will see that such attack
strategy is simple to realize in experiments but powerful
enough for Eve to steal keys without being discovered in
the following sections.
7FIG. 3. A concept scheme of Eve’s HD blinding attack in CV-QKD. Alice: preparation of the coherent state with Gaussian
modulation (VA); Eve: Heterodyne measurement XM , PM , re-preparation XE , PE and external light state XE,ext, PE,ext; Bob:
HD measurement:XB , PB ; BS: beam-splitter, LO: local oscillator, PD, pin photodiode, AMP: amplifiers, ADC: analog-to-digital
converter
B. Eve’s attack strategy
By targeting on a typical implementation of CV-QKD
[17], we now present Eve’s HD blinding attack strat-
egy step by step along with a realistic implementation
of Alice and Bob’s GMCS CV-QKD protocol (a concept
scheme of the attack strategy is shown in Fig. 3):
1. In GMCS CV-QKD, Alice prepares quantum sig-
nal |X + iP 〉 in which amplitude X and phase P
quadratures are continuously modulated with a bi-
variate centered Gaussian distribution (Due to the
symmetric of X and P , we will only look at the X
quadrature in our analysis):
X = XA +X0, (10)
with a variance VA = 〈X2A〉−〈XA〉2 and the vacuum
noise 〈X20 〉 = 1.
2. Eve cuts down the quantum channel and performs
a full IR attack [39] : Eve intercepts Alice’s signals
by performing heterodyne detection on X and P
quadratures to obtain measurement result:
XM =
1√
2
(XA +X0 +X
′
0), (11)
here, due to the BS in heterodyne detection, there
is a factor 1/
√
2 for loss and a vacuum state X ′0
added. According to her measurements (XM , PM ),
Eve prepares and resends her noisy coherent states
|XE + iPE〉 as signals to Bob through a lossy chan-
nel with transmission of T :
XE =gXM +X
′′
0
=
g√
2
(XA +X0 +X
′
0) +X
′′
0 ,
(12)
in which, g =
√
2 is the gain factor to compensate
the loss due to heterodyne detection and X ′′0 is a
noise term due to coherent state encoding of Eve.
X ′0 and X
′′
0 all follow a centered normal distribution
with unity variance.
3. Along with her resending signals, Eve inserts ex-
ternal laser pulses into the signal port of Bob’s HD
which is not coherent with CV-QKD signals. In
practice, Eve needs to choose the properties of the
external light: wavelength is slightly different from
Alice’s signal; pulse width and repetition rate are
same as Alice’s signals; intensity or photons per
pulse depends on how much Eve wants to influence
on Bob’s HD measurement which will be analyzed
in the next section. In order to insert such pulses
into Bob’s HD, Eve can set the polarization of them
as the ones of the CV-QKD signals, if polarization
multiplexing technique is used [19].
4. Bob performs HD measurements on the incoming
Eve’s signal pulses interfering with LO pulses and
the external laser pulses interfering with vacuum.
Since the external laser pulses are incoherent with
CV-QKD signals, there are no interferences be-
tween the external light and LO pulses, we can in-
dependently analyze the impact of external laser
and Eve’s IR signals on Bob’s HD output signals.
Regarding to a HD with an ideal infinite detection
range (−∞,∞) and an efficiency of η, Bob’s HD
output signal can be given as:
XBi =
√
ηIlo[
√
ηT (XE +Xtech) +
√
1− ηTX ′′′0 ]
+XE,ext +Xele,
(13)
in whichXtech is the noise term due to any technical
noises from Eve, Alice and Bob’s devices; X ′′′0 is an-
other vacuum state due to loss in Bob’s HD; XE,ext
is the external light state that impacts on Bob’s HD
output, which can be treated as the case there is
8only LO pulses go into HD (Eq. (5) in Sec. III A):
XE,ext = η(1− 2Text)Iext + 2
√
ηText(1− Text)IextX ′′′′0 ,
(14)
here Text is the overall transmission of HD regard-
ing to the external light pulses that goes into signal
port, Iext is number of photons per external light
pulse, X ′′′′0 is the vacuum state that interferes with
the external light. As Bob’s HD balance setting is
only valid for LO pulses go into LO port, the over-
all imbalance factor ext = 1−2Text of the external
light pulses will contribute non-negligible offsets to
final HD signals. The second term of Eq. (14) will
contribute its own shot noise into CV-QKD excess
noise. In a realistic case, Bob’s HD only operates
linearly with a finite detection range [α2, α1] as dis-
cussed in Sec. III, thus Bob’s HD output signal is
given by Eq. (9) in which XBi [Eq. (13)] replaces
the term of XHD.
5. Alice and Bob perform classical post processing on
their correlated data (XA, XB): sifting, parameter
estimation, reverse reconciliation and privacy am-
plification in order to obtain keys. Due to Eve’s
external light, Alice and Bob may believe their ex-
cess noise is still below the null threshold which will
cause them to accept compromised keys.
6. Eve listens to the classical communication between
Alice and Bob, in order to perform the same post
processing of Alice and Bob on her data to get iden-
tical keys.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND SIMULATIONS
In this section, we will demonstrate in simulation of
Eve’s attack strategy in Sec. IV B and show that how Eve
can in practice break the security of Alice and Bob GMCS
CV-QKD system with a realistic parameter setting.
A. Realistic assumptions of Alice, Bob and Eve
In the security analysis, it is necessary to assume Al-
ice and Bob’s CV-QKD implementation setup; and Eve’s
power in a realistic scenario such that Eve’s security
breach can be valid. We first consider the assumptions
of Alice and Bob’s CV-QKD implementation and their
device parameters:
• Alice optimizes her Gaussian modulation variance
VA ∈ {1, 100} based on the distance [33].
• Bob balances his HD on the LO pulses that go into
LO port such that Tlo ≈ 0.5 and one LO pulse
contains Ilo = 10
8 number of photons at Bob side.
Thus the impact of LO leakage on HD is assumed
to be negligible.
• Alice and Bob implement real time shot noise cal-
ibration as in Ref. [19], their shot noise N0 = ηIlo
is assumed to be not tampered by Eve. Such as-
sumption can be extended to the case that Alice
and Bob use LLO scheme [24]
• Bob’s HD efficiency η = 0.6, electronic noise vari-
ance vele = 0.01N0, linear detection limit α1 =
−α2 = 20
√
N0. Such limits are considered large
enough to ensure Bob’s HD operating in normal
case. Alice and Bob calibrate η and vele before
CV-QKD protocol.
• Alice and Bob perform reverse reconciliation with
a reconciliation efficiency of 95%.
We now consider Eve’s attack strategy assumptions:
• Eve’s station is right after Alice station. The loss
between Alice and Bob is identical to the one be-
tween Eve and Bob which is given by T = 10−aL/10,
L is the distance between Alice and Bob, a =
0.21dB/km is the standard loss coefficient of sin-
gle mode fiber in 1550 nm.
• Eve inserts the external light beside Bob’s station
such that Eve can control precisely its power (Iext)
without it going through the lossy channel.
• Eve inserts the external light into Bob’s HD signal
port and its overall transmission on Bob’s HD is
Text = 0.49. Note Eve is assumed to know Text
and can control its value by using shorter or longer
wavelength as in the wavelength attack [21–23].
B. Eve’s impact and excess noise contribution
Based on these assumptions, we can now analyze Eve’s
impact and excess noise contribution over Alice and Bob
CV-QKD protocol. From Alice and Bob’s point of views,
all the statistical quantities need to be normalized into
shot noise units which will be considered in the following
analysis. From Eve’s strategy mentioned above, there are
mainly three parts of excess noise due to Eve’s attack:
noise due to IR attack ξIR, noise due to the external
light ξext and noise due to technical imperfections ξtech.
Since LO pulses and external light pulses are in different
modes, we can separately evaluate ξIR and ξext.
As in the step (2) of Eve’s strategy, Eve’s IR attack
adds one vacuum noise due to the 50/50 BS in the het-
erodyne detection (X ′0) and another one due to coherent
encoding (X ′′0 ) which gives ξIR = 2 [39]. We further
consider total technical noise due to Alice, Bob and Eve
devices imperfections as ξtech = 0.1 which is an experi-
mental result in Ref. [39].
Regarding to noise due to the external light in the step
(3) and (4) of Eve’s strategy, as the analysis in Sec. III A,
9there are mainly two parts: the external light’s own shot
noise N0,ext and laser intensity fluctuation noise Vf,ext
due to insufficient subtraction of Bob’s HD. If we further
express these values into shot noise units with ηIlo, we
can know their excess noise contribution:
N0,ext = 4Text(1− Text)Iext/Ilo, (15)
Vf,ext = ηf
2
ext(1− 2Text)2I2ext/Ilo, (16)
in which fext is external laser’s intensity fluctuation ra-
tio, we consider that Eve has an ultra stable laser source
fext = 0.1% or a normal laser source fext = 2%. Thus
the total noise due to Eve’s external light is given by:
VB2 = N0,ext + Vf,ext (17)
= 4Text(1− Text)R+R2ηf2ext(1− 2Text)2Ilo, (18)
in which R = Iext/Ilo is the ratio between photon number
of one Eve’s external light pulse and one Bob’s LO pulse.
Note VB2 is the noise due to external light at Bob side,
the equivalent noise of VB2 on Alice side needs take the
transmission T into account. Thus the total excess noise
due to the external light is given as:
ξext = 4Text(1− Text)R/T +R2ηf2ext(1− 2Text)2Ilo/T.
(19)
We now summarize all these noises due to Eve’s attack
in Fig. 4. As we can see, N0,ext and Vf,ext due to external
laser increases with Iext. If Eve uses a stable laser source
as her external light with fext = 0.1%, the dominant noise
contribution is from its shot noise N0,ext. However if Eve
uses a common laser source with fext = 2%, the inten-
sity fluctuation noise Vf,ext will take the lead and induce
more disturbances on CV-QKD signals, which needs to
consider in practice. In our later analysis, we will con-
sider fext = 0.1% in Eve’s attack. We can also observe
that Eve’s external light noise increases with Alice and
Bob distance L due to the factor of 1/T , as the external
light is inserted at Bob’s side. On the other hand, Eve’s
external light also contributes a non-negligible offset on
Bob’s HD output signal as discussed in Sec. III A, which
is under Eve’s control through Text and Iext:
Dext =
√
η/Ilo(1− 2Text)Iext = R
√
ηIlo(1− 2Text).
(20)
Note Dext is normalized in
√
N0. As Dext is proportional
to Iext, it means if Eve wants more influence from exter-
nal light on Bob’s HD, she needs to increase ξext which
may potentially limit the power of the attack. In order
to achieve a security breach, Eve needs to properly set
Dext in order to cause large enough offset to force Bob’s
HD works in the saturation region, which will help Eve
to effectively bias the noises ξIR, ξext and ξtech due to the
attack.
FIG. 4. Excess noise contributions, for different blinding at-
tack parameters, as a function of the photon number per pulse
ratio R. Solid curves stand for the excess noise due to blind-
ing laser intensity fluctuation (see text). Dashed curve stands
for excess noise added by blinding laser shot noise. The upper
dashed dotted line stands for the excess noise due to the IR
attack, the lower dashed dotted line stands for the technical
excess noises, which are independent of the external blinding
laser.
C. Alice and Bob’s parameter estimation under
Eve’s attack
In order to determine whether Eve can have a security
breach under the HD blinding attack, we need to evalu-
ate the parameter estimation of Alice and Bob: channel
transmission Tˆ and excess noise ξˆ, to see whether Eve can
bias the excess noise due to the attack small enough such
that Alice and Bob believe they can still share a secret
key. A security breach thus corresponds to the condition:
ξˆ < ξnull, in which ξnull is the null key threshold corre-
sponds to the maximum excess noise that allows Alice
and Bob to extract a secret key under collective attack
model[35] for given values of Tˆ and VA. According to the
standard parameter estimation procedure of CV-QKD in
Sec. II A, we can estimate Tˆ and ξˆ based on Eqs. (2)
and (3).
We first consider the case where Bob’s HD linear range
is infinite (−∞,∞). In this case, we can predict the mean
of Bob’s HD measurement 〈XBi〉 = Dext and its variance:
VBi =〈X2Bi〉 − 〈XBi〉2 (21)
=ηT (ξIR + ξext + ξtech) + 1 + vele, (22)
in which, we can directly deduce the channel transmis-
sion estimation of Alice and Bob: Tˆi = T and their ex-
cess noise estimation: ξˆi = ξIR + ξtech + ξext. It is ob-
vious that Alice and Bob can easily spot Eve’s attack
action if Bob’s HD works in linear region, as ξˆi >> ξnull
at any distances. However, if Bob performs a realis-
tic HD measurement with a finite linear range [α2, α1],
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FIG. 5. Simulation of the impact of detector saturation on
the quadratures distribution XB versus XA, for two sets
of parameters. Red (dark gray): XB HD detection range
[−20√N0, 20
√
N0], green (light gray): XBi HD ideal linear
case. The corresponding estimation of Tˆ and ξˆ are both given
in the legend for XB and XBi respectively. (a) R = 0.11, no
security breach as ξˆr >> ξnull; (b) R = 0.1274, security breach
as ξˆr < ξnull. For both case, ξˆi >> ξnull.
Eve can manipulate Bob’s HD signal statistics by con-
trolling Dext through R which affect Bob’s HD output
statistics and further bias Alice and Bob’s parameter es-
timation. We now demonstrate Eve’s action on R and
its impact on Alice and Bob’s data (XA, XB) in simula-
tion. As shown in Fig. 5 (a) and (b) , we consider Eve
uses R = 0.1 and R = 0.1274 respectively in her strat-
egy at distance L = 25km , in which XA, XBi (green
or light gray) correspond to Bob’s HD linger range is
infinite (−∞,∞) and (XA, XB) (red or dark gray) cor-
respond to Bob’s HD is limited to [α2, α1]. If Alice and
Bob perform parameter estimation based on (XA, XBi),
there is only a displacement Dext has been introduced
on Bob’s data, they can still notice Eve’s attack base
FIG. 6. Alice and Bob’s transmission estimation versus dis-
tance under Eve’s HD blinding attack. The black dashed
curve (top one) corresponds to Tˆi that is estimated by XBi
in the linear case ; while the other lower curves correspond
to Tˆr in the realistic case that are estimated by XB with
R = 0.1, 0.11, 0.12, 0.13, 0.14 from top to bottom.
on Tˆi and ξˆi. However, Alice and Bob may not be able
to detect Eve’s action based on (XA, XB), as Eve can
gradually increase R in order to force parts of Bob’s
HD signals saturated and bias the estimation Tˆr and ξˆr.
Due to Bob’s HD saturation, XB variation is limited by
Bob’s upper detection limit α2 = 20 which results in
smaller variance of Bob compared to the one of XBi and
a weaker covariance correlation between Alice and Bob,
which leads Tˆr < Tˆi. If Eve chooses properly the value of
R, she can eventually meet the condition ξˆr < ξnull. In
Fig. 5(a) Eve’s choice of R = 0.1 can not lead to a secu-
rity breach as ξˆr = 2.5813 > ξnull = 0.1013 at 25km. If
Eve keeps increasing Iext, as shown in Fig. 5(b) the choice
of R = 0.1274 corresponds to a security breach condition
as ξˆr = 0.0367 < ξnull. In Fig. 5, statistical measure-
ments are based on N = 107 simulation data for linear
HD (green or light gray) and saturation HD case (red
or dark gray). It shows that Eve’s external light power
needs to be high enough to affect sufficiently Bob’s data
distribution in order to achieve a security breach, oth-
erwise, Alice and Bob can still detect the noise due to
Eve’s attack.
We further analyze Eve’s choice of R to meet the con-
dition ξˆr < ξnull. In the simulation of Eve’s attack, we
use the HD model in Sec. III A and standard parameter
estimation procedure of CV-QKD in Sec. II A to estimate
Tˆr and ξˆr for Alice and Bob. Particularly, we calculate
Tˆr and ξˆr by increasing the value of Iext and thus the
ratio R. In Fig. 6, we show the impact of R on Tˆr over
distance L = 0 ∼ 100km. As shown in Fig. 6, Eve’s ex-
ternal light reduce Alice and Bob’s channel transmission
Tˆr as expected, however such reduction will not prevent
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Alice and Bob to proceed to key generation. As long
as ξˆr < ξnull, there is still a security breach. To illus-
trate Eve’s impact on Alice and Bob’s estimation of ξˆr,
we continuously increase R and deduce corresponding ξˆr
and ξnull for a given setting of VA and Tˆr. The results
of ξˆr and ξnull versus R are shown in Fig. 7 for different
distances L = 20, 25, 30, 35, 40km, in which excess noise
ξˆr in HD linear region increases with R and with dis-
tance due to the factor of Tˆr. According to the previous
analysis, Eve’s noises consist constant noises: 0.1 due to
technical imperfections and 2 due to IR attack; variable
noises increasing with R: the shot noise of the external
laser and its intensity fluctuation noise. The total noise
is much higher than the tolerable excess noise for Alice
and Bob to generate a key (ξnull ∼ 10%N0) and thus it
will reveal Eve’s presence.
However ξˆr decrease sharply when R > 0.12, since cor-
responding offset Dext overpass the HD detection limit
α1, such that ξˆr is effectively biased by Eve. As shown in
previous analysis, due to HD saturation, Bob’s HD vari-
ance and his data’s covariance with Alice both become
smaller. However the impact of HD saturation on its
variance degradation is much larger than on the covari-
ance, which results in a quick drop of ξˆr. Although the
curves in Fig. 7(a) sharply decreases around R = 0.12,
each value of ξˆr only corresponds to one value of R.
As shown in Fig. 7(b), a more precise control of R will
help Eve to manipulate ξˆr to an arbitrary value between
0 and ξnull. It means once Eve has enough precision
on the power of the external laser, she can accurately
manipulate Alice and Bob’s excess noise estimation to
any small value she desires. For example, according to
the simulations, a successful attack is possible with the
choice of Iext = RIlo = 0.1274 × 108 = 1274 × 104 and
fextIext = 1274 which shows that Eve needs a precision
of 104 photons and a stability of 103 photons level on
one external laser pulse in order to accurately bias the
excess noise estimation. Such precision is realistic and
achievable with current technology.
For a given distance, Eve can in practice choose a
proper value of R to achieve ξˆr < ξnull such that Alice
and Bob still believe they share a secure key according
to their parameter estimation and proceed to key gen-
eration however the generated keys are not secure at all
because of Eve’s IR attack. In principle, Eve can set ξˆr
to be arbitrary close to zero, which further enables her
to control Alice and Bob key rate generation. Figure 7 is
a reference for Eve to properly set the value of R.
VI. COUNTERMEASURES
In DV-QKD, blinding attack is well known for breaking
security on various protocols through controlling differ-
ent types of SPDs such as avalanche photodiode (APD)
[6, 8] and superconducting nanowire SPD [46, 47]. This
kind of detector controlled attack based on bright illu-
FIG. 7. Excess noise estimation of Alice and Bob versus pho-
ton number ratio R, η = 0.55, Text = 0.49, fext = 0.1%,
vele = 0.01. (a) Rang of R: 0-0.14, (b) Range of R: 0.124-
0.13. The upper five curves stand for the excess noise estima-
tions ξˆr at different distances, the lower two curves stand for
the null key thresholds ξnull at 20 kmand 40 km.
mination now extends to CV-QKD using HD as shown
in this paper. In both CV and DV case, Eve is required
to send a relatively strong classical light to actively con-
trol Bob’s detector. Due to such similarity, countermea-
sures against blinding attack in DV-QKD are thus worth
to consider to defeat HD blinding attack in CV-QKD.
Here we briefly discuses several possible countermeasures
against HD blinding attack in CV-QKD and compare
them with the ones in DV-QKD.
In the first approach, a straight forward countermea-
sure is to monitor the light intensity that is going into
signal port of HD. Bob can implement such countermea-
sure using a sensitive p-i-n photodiode, in order to de-
tect any strong light impinging on the signal port. Such
method can be also used for energy test that is required
in some security proofs [37]. It is however challenging
to build a detection system that can give in practice the
capability to detect light in any optical mode that Eve ay
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try to use. In DV-QKD, such watchdog detectors have
been proposed [9] and implemented [48] to detect blind-
ing attack. However, it has been shown that practical
watchdog may not always be able to rise the alarm [49].
Moreover, Eve may also use high power laser to damage
the photodiode watchdog and bypass the security alarm
of the QKD protocol [50].
Bob’s HD consists of two classical photodiodes (PDs).
Hence, instead of measuring the difference between the
two photocurrents, Bob may also monitor one, or the
sum of the two photocurrents, from two PDs. This may
be however challenging in practice, as it will disturb the
HD output, and as it can be difficult to set a proper dis-
crimination level to correctly detect, against blinding at-
tack. In our proposed blinding attack strategy, Eve only
need to increase the overall energy by about 12%. Hence
LO intensity fluctuations, due to Alice’s laser source and
channel environment may exceed the external light’s en-
ergy, which can lead to false alarms. In addition, it is
currently been technically challenging to design a high
gain, high bandwidth, high efficiency, low noise HD in
practice for CV-QKD purposes. Adding extra electron-
ics components can increase the electronic noises and re-
duce HD performance. A similar approach in DV-QKD
has been also proposed, in which Bob monitors the pho-
tocurrent from APD [51]. Unfortunately, such method
was later proven not sufficiently to detect the blinding
attack in many particular cases [11]. Moreover, in addi-
tion to monitoring the photocurrent from APD, one may
use the synchronization detector as an auxiliary monitor
to detect the blinding light [52].
A third countermeasure has been proposed in the
Ref.[53]: Alice and Bob test the linearity between the
noise and signal measurement by using an active attenu-
ation device on Bob’s side, i.e. an amplitude modulator.
Such method explores the linearity of HD and can thus in
principle prevent the HD blinding attack: the randomiza-
tion of signal port’s attenuation prevents Eve to properly
set the intensity of blinding pulses. However, a practi-
cal amplitude modulator is wavelength sensitive which
can loose its amplitude extension when the wavelength
is out of the spectral range. In addition, such linearity
test increases the implementation complexity and detec-
tor losses. A similar approach, based on random detector
efficiency has also been proposed in DV-QKD [54], yet it
has been shown that it is not always effective in a prac-
tical implementation [10].
The three previous approaches require some modifica-
tions to the CV-QKD system hardware, leading to ad-
ditional experimental complexity. We suggest, on the
other hand, that data post-processing combined with cal-
ibrated homodyne detection, can be a simple and effi-
cient way to counter the blinding attack. We propose
the following generic method: Bob sets security thresh-
olds [S2, S1] inside the HD limits [α2, α1]. In the param-
eter estimation stage, Alice and Bob can thus estimate,
for each block, the fraction of the HD measurement data
that have been recorded outside of the interval [S2, S1].
If a too large fraction of HD measurements is recorded
beyond the thresholds, then Alice and Bob know the HD
was not working in its linear range for some non ne-
glectable fraction of the quantum communication phase,
and they discard the block. This approach relies on the
per-calibration of HD detection limits (the values of α1
and α2 which is required to be performed with a good pre-
cision (compared to N0) and in a safe environment. Set-
ting the value of the confidence interval [S2, S1] and the
fraction of rejected data that can be tolerated will require
further work taking finite-size effects into account and in-
cluding a characterization of statistical fluctuations.
Finally, since HD blinding attack is a detector-based
attack, MDI CV-QKD [55–57] can be a potential solu-
tion to defeat such attack. Although a proof-of-principle
demonstration of MDI CV-QKD has been already per-
formed in experiment [57], there is still a large gap be-
tween practical implementation and theoretical proposal.
There are even debates on whether MDI CV-QKD can
become practical regarding to its theoretical performance
limitations and current available technologies [58, 59].
Recent works in finite size [60] and composable [61] se-
curity proofs of MDI CV-QKD have shown some practi-
cal feasibilities of such protocol from theoretical perspec-
tives. This paper may be an additional motivation for
future development of practical MDI in CV-QKD, sim-
ilarly to the role played by the blinding attack in DV-
QKD, to trigger the birth of MDI QKD [12, 13] and its
deployment [62].
These countermeasures show that current CV QKD
implementations need some upgrades in hardware or soft-
ware to defeat the proposed attack. It is even more im-
portant to verify the functionality of these countermea-
sures in practice, as they may fail to defeat the attacks
if they are not correctly implemented as in the cases of
DV-QKD [10, 11].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we detail an attack strategy exploit-
ing the homodyne detection vulnerability [28, 29] that
is moreover implementable with low experimental com-
plexity. Inspired by and analogous to the blinding attack
in DV-QKD, our attack allows Eve to influence Bob’s
homodyne detection response, by sending external light.
We demonstrate that this attack can constitutes a power-
ful strategy, that can fully break the security of practical
CV-QKD systems. Based on experimental observations,
we propose an effective model to account for homodyne
detection imperfections and use it to model Eve’s at-
tack. Simulation results illustrate the feasibility of our
proposed attack under realistic experimental conditions.
Compared to other side channel attacks in CV-QKD re-
quiring complex experimental techniques [22, 23, 28], we
believe our strategy should be simple enough to allow
effective eavesdropping demonstration on deployed CV-
QKD. This attack hence highlights the importance of
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exploring the assumptions in security proofs when im-
plementing CV-QKD protocols and the necessity to im-
plement suitable countermeasure to ensure the practical
security of CV-QKD systems.
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